Multy-party Security Protocols

My research area is the field of multy-party security protocols, whereby I focus mainly on anonymity issues.


Currently I work on the specification, implementation and analysis of a general-purpose secure anonymity architecture (more info [here]). It should become a general framework for different anonymity services ranging from anonymous message sending to anonymous authorization (e.g. e-payment, e-voting), built-up as an extensible layer hierarchy (ADL-Anonymous Datagram Layer, ASL-Anonymous Session Layer, AH-Anonymous Handshake) on top of the Internet's TCP/IP.

This research idea has been prized by the Werner von Siemens Award 2003, for which the project describing application can be downloaded [here].


The PROB-channel (Passive, Real-time, Observable, Black-box) is a formally defined anonymous message sending technique. Aim was to specify a simple scenario, where a theoretically based measure for the unspecified term "anonymity" could be given. Thus the paper presenting the model (submitted to PET'04, [PDF]) introduces the source and destination hiding properties to act as such measures and defines criteria to achieve a given level of anonymity.

The PROB-channel was implemented as the first anonymous message transmission technique to conform to the ADL layer interface in the GPSAA project.


The Anonymity Enhancing Protocol (AEP) was originally designed as a general framework for anonymous authorization techniques (such as e-payment, etc.). It specified the interfaces and communication between three parties: the anonymous subject, the service provider and the anonymity authority (see more [here]).

Currently AEP is being integrated into GPSAA as an implementation to conform to the AH (Anonymous Handshake) interface.


The list of my publications can be found [here].